Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):277 – 297 (2000)

Abstract
Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080050128123
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References found in this work BETA

Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.

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Religion as an Evolutionary Byproduct: A Critique of the Standard Model.R. Powell & S. Clarke - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):457-486.
A Cognitive Perspective on Scientific Realism.Michael Vlerick - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1157-1178.

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