Rascals, Triflers, and Pragmatists: Developing a Peircean Account of Assertion

Authors
Kenneth Boyd
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
While the topic of assertion has recently received a fresh wave of interest from Peirce scholars, to this point no systematic account of Peirce’s view of assertion has been attempted. We think that this is a lacuna that ought to be filled. Doing so will help make better sense of Peirce’s pragmatism; further, what is hidden amongst various fragments is a robust pragmatist theory of assertion with unique characteristics that may have significant contemporary value. Here we aim to uncover this theory, and to show that assertion for Peirce is not a mere corollary of pragmatic conceptions of truth, judgement, and belief, but is rather a central aspect of his philosophy.
Keywords C.S. Peirce  pragmatism  assertion
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DOI 10.1080/09608788.2016.1255178
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References found in this work BETA

On Peirce.Cornelis De Waal - 2001 - Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

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Citations of this work BETA

Peirce on Intuition, Instinct, and Common Sense.Kenneth Boyd & Diana Heney - 2017 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (2).

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