The Fine-Tuning Argument Against the Multiverse

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of this universe fail to support a multiverse hypothesis, but it tends to favor a single-universe hypothesis instead.

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-05-31

Downloads
1,072 (#21,260)

6 months
546 (#2,843)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Philip Swenson
William & Mary
Kenneth Boyce
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Existence of God.Richard Swinburne - 1979 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.
Fine-tuning and multiple universes.Roger White - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):260–276.

View all 31 references / Add more references