Transparent Self-Knowledge

Authors
Matthew Boyle
University of Chicago
Abstract
I distinguish two ways of explaining our capacity for ‘transparent’ knowledge of our own present beliefs, perceptions, and intentions: an inferential and a reflective approach. Alex Byrne (2011) has defended an inferential approach, but I argue that this approach faces a basic difficulty, and that a reflective approach avoids the difficulty. I conclude with a brief sketch and defence of a reflective approach to our transparent self-knowledge, and I show how this approach is connected with the thesis that we must distinguish between a kind of self-knowledge that is of oneself as agent and another kind that is of oneself as patient
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Puzzle of Transparency and How to Solve It.Wolfgang Barz - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
Deferring to Others About One's Own Mind.Casey Doyle - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.

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Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Interests and the Growth of Knowledge.Barry Barnes - 1977 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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