Erkenntnis 80 (3):477-486 (2015)

Authors
Vojislav Bozickovic
Univerzitet u Beogradu
Abstract
Concerning cases involving temporal indexicals Kaplan has argued that Fregean thoughts cannot be the bearers of cognitive significance due to the alleged fact that one can think the same thought from one occasion to the next without realizing this—thus linking the issue of cognitive significance to that of belief retention. Kaplan comes up with his own version of the Fregean strategy for accounting for belief retention that does not face this kind of a problem; but he finds it deficient because it leads us to implausibly deny that one who is lost in time retains the beliefs one held before this occurred. I take issue with Kaplan though in conformity with his plausible demands about belief retention and argue that a situation does not arise in which one can fail to realize that one is thinking the same thought from one occasion to the next. I also argue that thoughts are the bearers of cognitive significance as well as explanatory of belief retention
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9711-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Stoic Disagreement and Belief Retention.Michael Rieppel - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):243-262.
On the Persistence of Indexical Belief.Joao Branquinho - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:21-30.
An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics.Adam Pautz - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347.
On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions.João Branquinho - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:17-27.
Self-Deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Do Characters Play a Cognitive Role?Vojislav Bozickovic - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):219 – 229.
Rip Van Winkle and Other Characters.John Perry - 1996 - European Review of Philosophy 2:13-39.
The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics.João Branquinho - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien Grazen 56:2-15.
Donnellan on a Puzzle About Belief.Graeme Forbes - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):169 - 180.
A Dichotomy Sustained.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (2):187-211.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-12-21

Total views
164 ( #71,281 of 2,504,843 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #119,383 of 2,504,843 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes