Dissertation, Bogazici University (2017)

Ayse Bozdag
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
The belief base approach to belief representation and belief dynamics is developed as an alternative to the belief set approaches, which are pioneered by the AGM model. The belief base approach models collections of information and expectations of an agent as possibly incomplete and possibly inconsistent foundations for her beliefs. Nevertheless, the beliefs of an agent are always consistent; this is ensured by a sophisticated inference relation. Belief changes take place on the information base instead of on the belief set, providing a reasonable account of belief change, for the content of the information base is much smaller than a closed belief set, and directly accessible by the agent for its elements are characterized as explicit and non- inferential information the agent acquires, while the closed belief set represents what the agent is committed to believe. In chapter 2, I present an investigation of the belief base approach, both its statics (formation of beliefs from an information base) and its dynamics, while presenting the consequences of the approach; as well as a brief investigation of the AGM model as the representative of the belief set approaches, to make comparisons between the two approaches. In chapter 3, I offer a modal model of the statics of the belief base approach using situation semantics. The choice of semantics is primarily due to that situation semantics can model incomplete and inconsistent collections of sentences. The belief modality offered in this model is intended to capture the inference process in the belief base approach as much as possible.
Keywords Belief Revision  Belief Change  Belief Base  Situaiton Semantics
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Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Situations and Attitudes.Nino B. Cocchiarella - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (2):470.

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