Artificial Intelligence, Creativity, and the Precarity of Human Connection

Oxford Intersections: Ai in Society (forthcoming)
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Abstract

There is an underappreciated respect in which the widespread availability of generative artificial intelligence (AI) models poses a threat to human connection. My central contention is that human creativity is especially capable of helping us connect to others in a valuable way, but the widespread availability of generative AI models reduces our incentives to engage in various sorts of creative work in the arts and sciences. I argue that creative endeavors must be motivated by curiosity, and so they must disclose the creative agent’s inquisitive self. It is through self-disclosure, including the disclosure of the inquisitive self, that we put ourselves in a position to be seen by and connect with others through our creative pursuits. Because relying on AI for certain generative tasks is less self-disclosive than the creative work such technologies supplant, this reliance threatens to weaken our connections to one another.

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The Curious Case of Uncurious Creation.Lindsay Brainard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Artificial Creativity in advance.Timothy Barker - forthcoming - Journal of Continental Philosophy.

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Lindsay Brainard
University of Alabama, Birmingham

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Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56 (C):72-83.

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