Contextualism about 'might' and says-that ascriptions

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):485-511 (2013)

Authors
David Braun
State University of New York, Buffalo
Abstract
Contextualism about ‘might’ says that the property that ‘might’ expresses varies from context to context. I argue against contextualism. I focus on problems that contextualism apparently has with attitude ascriptions in which ‘might’ appears in an embedded ‘that’-clause. I argue that contextualists can deal rather easily with many of these problems, but I also argue that serious difficulties remain with collective and quantified says-that ascriptions. Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne atempt to deal with these remaining problems, but I argue that their attempt fails.
Keywords Contextualism  Invariantism  ‘‘Might’’  Epistemic modals  Modals  Cappelen  Hawthorne  Disquotation
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9861-3
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Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

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