Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions

Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81 (2002)
Abstract
We use names to talk about objects. We use predicates to talk about properties and relations. We use sentences to attribute properties and relations to objects. We say things when we utter sentences, often things we believe
Keywords Logic  Name  Proposition  Reference  Semantics
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1015760114297
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The Broadest Necessity.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (5):733-783.
Millian Descriptivism.Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.

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