California unnatural: On fine's natural ontological attitude

Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):232-235 (1997)
Abela accepts Fine’s account of realism and instrumentalism, but thinks that we can reject the Natural Ontological Attitude by distinguishing the theoretical attempt to make sense of scientific practice from choosing the attitude we bring to the debate, or to science itself. But Abela’s attitudes are vulnerable to Fine’s criticisms of the philosophical positions. However, if we take attitude as contrastive and as full‐blooded enough to lead to different behaviour we can see a gap in Fine’s position. He cannot tell us why it is science that he trusts. When we look more widely, the philosophical positions might be seen as ways of justifying that trust
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00058
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Ernest Gellner (1986). Relativism and the Social Sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):367-369.

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