In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago (2013)

Authors
Darren Bradley
University of Leeds
Abstract
How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief change to model how they function, and that this gives Perry’s (1977) two tier account the advantage over Lewis’s (1979) theory
Keywords Self-locating belief  Belief de se  Dynamic Beliefs
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References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Bayes or Bust?John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Diachronic Norms for Self-Locating Beliefs.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.

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