Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):169-191 (2013)

Authors
Matthew Braddock
University of Tennessee, Martin
Abstract
Dogged resistance to demanding moral views frequently takes the form of The Demandingness Objection. Premise (1): Moral view V demands too much of us. Premise (2): If a moral view demands too much of us, then it is mistaken. Conclusion: Therefore, moral view V is mistaken. Objections of this form harass major theories in normative ethics as well as prominent moral views in applied ethics and political philosophy. The present paper does the following: (i) it clarifies and distinguishes between various demandingness objections in the philosophical literature, (ii) identifies a formidable and interesting form of the demandingness objection that targets a wide scope of moral views, and (iii) defuses this objection by developing a local skeptical argument from unreliability the form of which may, interestingly, be effectively deployed in other areas of philosophy.
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DOI 10.1111/josp.12018
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Utilitarianism: For and Against.J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams - 1973 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium.Brian Berkey - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3015-3035.
Collective Obligations and Demandingness Complaints.Brian Berkey - 2019 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 6 (1):113-132.
Demandingness and Public Health Ethics.Julian Savulescu & Alberto Giubilini - 2019 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 6 (1):65-87.
Altruism and Ambition in the Dynamic Moral Life.Tom Dougherty - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):716-729.
Demokrati Og Uvitenhet.Cornelius Cappelen & Herman Cappelen - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (2-03):185-198.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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