Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54 (2002)
One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective time. Since this assumption is false, Dennett's argument is unsuccessful. Like most eliminativist arguments, Dennett's arguments may indicate that the subjective character of experience is different from how it is often described, but this leaves plenty of room for alternative models of consciousness
|Keywords||Consciousness Eliminativism Indeterminate Philosophy Psychology Dennett, D|
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References found in this work BETA
Begging the Question Against Phenomenal Consciousness.Ned Block - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):205-206.
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.Edmund Husserl & Martin Heidegger - 1964 - University Microfilms International.
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