Freedom and binding consequentialism

Abstract

The paper proposes a new version of direct act consequentialism that will provide the same evaluations of the rightness of acts as indirect disposition, motive or character consequentialism, thus reconciling the coherence of direct consequentialism with the plausible results in cases of indirect consequentialism. This is achieved by seeing that adopting certain kinds of moral dispositions causally constrains our future acts, so that the maximizing acts ruled out by the disposition can no longer be chosen. Thus when we act we do the best we can, which is all that is required for rightness according to act consequentialism.

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2009-12-18

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David Braddon-Mitchell
University of Sydney

Citations of this work

Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydney

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