Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177 (2012)

Authors
Darren Bradley
University of Leeds
Abstract
This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-1539071
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References found in this work BETA

The Design Argument.Elliott Sober - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson: Figure 1.Darren Bradley - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):683-693.

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