Gender and the senses of agency

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2) (2018)
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Abstract

This paper details the ways that gender structures our senses of agency on an enactive framework. While it is common to discuss how gender influences higher, narrative levels of cognition, as with the formulation of goals and in considerations about our identities, it is less clear how gender structures our more immediate, embodied processes, such as the minimal sense of agency. While enactivists often acknowledge that gender and other aspects of our socio-cultural situatedness shape our cognitive processes, there is little work on how this shaping takes place. In order to provide such an account, I will first look at the minimal and narrative senses of agency (Gallagher 2012), a distinction that draws from work on minimal and narrative selves (Zahavi 2010). Next I will explain the influence of the narrative sense of agency on the minimal sense of agency through work on intention-formation (Pacherie 2007). After a discussion of the role of gender in the narrative sense of agency, I’ll expand on work by Haslanger (2012) and Young (1980) to offer three ways in which gender influences the minimal sense of agency, showing the effect that gender has on how we perceive our possibilities for interaction in a phenomenologically immediate, pre-reflective manner.

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Citations of this work

Social Doubt.Tom Roberts & Lucy Osler - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):1-18.
Facing Life: The messy bodies of enactive cognitive science.Marek McGann - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
Transparency and the Phenomenology of Extended Cognition.Gloria Andrada - forthcoming - Límite: Revista de Filosofía y Psicología.
Socio-cultural norms in ecological psychology: The education of intention.Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (1):1-19.

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