Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason

Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18 (1996)
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Abstract

I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such phenomena — or so I have proposed. Given that such phenomena are important in our practical lives, we may agree with Frankfurt that identification is, in this sense, "fundamental.".

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Michael Bratman
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
Structures of agency: essays.Michael Bratman - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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