Intention rationality

Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241 (2009)
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Abstract

The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about the transmission of practical reasons. In the end, my view draws on claims about what is involved in being a self-governing planning agent

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Michael Bratman
Stanford University

References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison, Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.

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