Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241 (2009)
The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about the transmission of practical reasons. In the end, my view draws on claims about what is involved in being a self-governing planning agent
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References found in this work BETA
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980.Bernard Arthur Owen Williams - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Making Our Ends Meet: Shared Intention, Goal Adoption and the Third-Person Perspective.Luca Tummolini - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):75-98.
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