Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512 (2006)
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| Abstract |
Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of "logical probability." The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in favor of bridging confirmation and evidential support.
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| DOI | 10.1086/518320 |
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Lotteries.Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211-226.
View all 11 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Experimental Explication.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):672-710.
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Not Enough There There Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.
On the Determinants of the Conjunction Fallacy: Probability Versus Inductive Confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.
A Second Look at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems).Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):365-385.
View all 18 citations / Add more citations
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