Mind and Language 13 (1):29-34 (1998)

David Braddon-Mitchell
University of Sydney
The paper makes three points about the modularity of folk psychology and the significance of metarepresentation: The hope that metarepresentation may provide a principled divide between intentional and merely representational systems focuses on a divide of mechanism. I suggest that we also look for a divide of task: the difference could be a principled difference in the task performed by the systems, not in how the task is performed. There is no incompatibility between the hypothesis that folk psychology is modular and the observation that we have conscious access to some of the principles of folk psychology on even a slightly moderated understanding of modularity. Much of the debate about the theoretical nature of FP hangs on what counts as a theory. Different conceptions of theory form a continuum, and it is unclear what hangs on the position that FP occupies within it
Keywords Folk Psychology  Language  Representation  Sterelny, K
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00063
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