Theoria 65 (2-3):127-143 (1999)

Abstract
Over the last decades the traditional emphasis on moral rules, or principles, has been attacked by particularists like Jonathan Dancy. I argue that particularists are correct in rejecting traditional attempts at moral codification, but that it is still possible to have a rule-oriented approach to morality if we distinguish between different ways in which features can be morally relevant. I suggest that there are first a limited number of features that can serve as basic moral reasons for action, and then a class of relational features that can change the relevance of these features. I then argue that while particularists do well in drawing attention to the fact that sometimes our basic moral duties are put out of play by other relevant features, they fail to make sense of the exceptional nature of such situations. Only a rule-oriented understanding of morality can do this.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1999.tb01107.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,268
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Harvard University Press.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
Particularism and Default Valency.Simon Kirchin - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):16-32.
Moral Reasoning Without Rules.Alan H. Goldman - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (2):105-118.
Particular Reasons.Selim Berker - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):109-139.
The Constitutive Approach to Kantian Rigorism.Michael Cholbi - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):439-448.
Particularism and Moral Education.David Bakhurst - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):265 – 279.
Principle-Based Moral Judgement.Maike Albertzart - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.
Common Morality: Deciding What to Do.Bernard Gert - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Things Are What They Seem.Shimon Edelman - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):25-25.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-09-13

Total views
48 ( #193,089 of 2,325,392 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #451,872 of 2,325,392 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes