Russellianism and prediction

Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105 (2001)
Abstract
Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. They conclude that Russellianism isfalse. I defend Russellianism from this objection. I present severalanalyses of ``sentence S can be used to predict event E''. I arguethat, on each of these analyses, attitude ascriptions can be used topredict behavior, even if Russellianism is true. Furthermore, if myarguments are incorrect, and attitude ascriptions cannot be used topredict behavior under Russellianism, then Russellians can explainaway the intuition that they can be so used.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1010387013995
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,370
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room.Susan Schneider - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250.
On Non-Pragmatic Millianism.Andrea Onofri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Neo-Meinongian neo-Russellians.Seyed N. Mousavian - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):229-259.
Parts of Propositions.Cody Gilmore - 2014 - In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. pp. 156-208.
Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism.Brad J. Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
Russellian Propositions and Properties.Jan Almäng - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
Understanding Belief Reports.David M. Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
Russellianism and Explanation.David Braun - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
61 ( #88,602 of 2,193,788 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #145,958 of 2,193,788 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature