Russellianism and prediction

Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105 (2001)

David Braun
State University of New York, Buffalo
Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. They conclude that Russellianism isfalse. I defend Russellianism from this objection. I present severalanalyses of ``sentence S can be used to predict event E''. I arguethat, on each of these analyses, attitude ascriptions can be used topredict behavior, even if Russellianism is true. Furthermore, if myarguments are incorrect, and attitude ascriptions cannot be used topredict behavior under Russellianism, then Russellians can explainaway the intuition that they can be so used.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1010387013995
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,928
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room.Susan Schneider - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250.
The Problem of Puzzling Pairs.Michael Nelson - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):319 - 350.
Privileged Access, Externalism, and Ways of Believing.Andrew Cullison - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
Russellianism and Explanation.David Braun - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
Understanding Belief Reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
Russellian Propositions and Properties.Jan Almäng - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
Parts of Propositions.Cody Gilmore - 2014 - In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. pp. 156-208.
Neo-Meinongian neo-Russellians.Seyed N. Mousavian - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):229-259.


Added to PP index

Total views
85 ( #83,532 of 2,319,258 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #35,867 of 2,319,258 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature