Authors
Darren Bradley
University of Leeds
Abstract
There is a widely shared belief that the higher level sciences can provide better explanations than lower level sciences. But there is little agreement about exactly why this is so. It is often suggested that higher level explanations are better because they omit details. I will argue instead that the preference for higher level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, logically strong, beliefs. I argue that our preference for informative beliefs entirely accounts for why higher level explanations are sometimes better – and sometimes worse – than lower level explanations. The result is a step in the direction of the unity of science hypothesis.
Keywords explanation  reduction
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axy033
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References found in this work BETA

Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

What Is Bayesian Confirmation For?Darren Bradley - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):229-241.

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