In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 1-16 (1993)

Johannes Brandl
University of Salzburg
Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis
Keywords Holism  Language  Semantics  Fodor, J  Lepore, E
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DOI 10.5840/gps1993462
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Gonseth and Quine.Michael Esfeld - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (3):199–219.

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