Should subjective probabilities be sharp?

Episteme 11 (3):277-289 (2014)
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Abstract

There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga, that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We argue that these assumptions are too strong and that rational imprecise choice is possible in the absence of these overly strong conditions.

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Author Profiles

Katie Steele
Australian National University
Seamus Bradley
London School of Economics (PhD)

Citations of this work

On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 57-106.

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References found in this work

Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.
Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
Dutch bookies and money pumps.Frederic Schick - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):112-119.
Unsharp Sharpness.Nils-Eric Sahlin & Paul Weirich - 2014 - Theoria 80 (1):100-103.

View all 9 references / Add more references