Scaling the metaphorical brick wall

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):947-948 (1999)
Abstract
Palmer argues that functionalist accounts of the mind are radically incomplete in virtue of a “metaphorical brick wall” that precludes a complete treatment of qualia. I argue that functionalists should remain unmoved by this line of argument to the effect that their accounts fail to do justice to some “intrinsic” features of experience.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0140525X99252211
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,300
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Peirce Versus Davidson on Metaphorical Meaning.Aaron Wilson - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):117-135.
Metaphor and Moral Experience.A. E. Denham - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Metaphor and What is Said.Catherine Wearing - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (3):310–332.
Phenomenal Experience and Science: Separated by a “Brick Wall”?Michael Pauen - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):968-968.
A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism.Nikk Effingham & Jon Robson - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):633 – 640.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
21 ( #243,308 of 2,193,208 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,278 of 2,193,208 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature