Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111-130 (2006)

Authors
Ben Bradley
Syracuse University
Abstract
Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which Mooreans and Kantians have disagreed, but rather two distinct concepts. I state a number of principles about intrinsic value that have typically (though not universally) been held by Mooreans, all of which are typically denied by Kantians. I show that there are distinct theoretical roles for a concept of intrinsic value to play in a moral framework. When we notice these distinct theoretical roles, we should realize that there is room for two distinct concepts of intrinsic value within a single moral framework: one that accords with some or all of the Moorean principles, and one that does not.
Keywords Philosophy   Political Philosophy   Ontology   Ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10677-006-9009-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,025
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Environmental Ethics.Andrew Brennan - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value.F. Feldman - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), The Journal of Ethics. Springer. pp. 45--58.
Rethinking Intrinsic Value.Shelly Kagan - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), The Journal of Ethics. Springer. pp. 97--114.
Does Pleasure Have Intrinsic Value?Timothy E. Taylor - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):313-319.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?Ben Bradley - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.
Could There Be a Right to Own Intellectual Property?James Wilson - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (4):393 - 427.
The Situational Context on the Nature of Political Philosophy.Yoram Levy - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):535-556.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
262 ( #35,041 of 2,439,574 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #72,548 of 2,439,574 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes