Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217 (2013)

Authors
Ben Bramble
Australian National University
Abstract
In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain.
Keywords Pleasure  Distinctive Feeling View  Feels Good Theory  Aaron Smuts  Shelly Kagan
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9755-9
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2019 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 27-59.
Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 239-266.

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