The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217 (2013)

Authors
Ben Bramble
Princeton University
Abstract
In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain.
Keywords Pleasure  Distinctive Feeling View  Feels Good Theory  Aaron Smuts  Shelly Kagan
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9755-9
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

The Value of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):503-520.
Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2017 - Noûs 2017 (2):462-490.
How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.
Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False.Travis Timmerman & Felipe Pereira - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6 (25):697-705.

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