The fine-tuning argument

Religious Studies 37 (4):451-466 (2001)
Abstract
A frequent objection to the fine-tuning argument has been that although certain necessary conditions for life were admittedly exceedingly improbable, still, the many possible alternative sets of conditions were all equally improbable, so that no special significance is to be attached to the realization of the conditions of life. Some authors, however, have rejected this objection as fallacious. The object of this paper is to state the objection to the fine-tuning argument in a more telling form than has been done hitherto, and to meet the charge of fallacy.
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DOI 10.1017/S0034412501005790
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