João Branquinho
Universidade de Lisboa
This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan?s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans?s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan?s account and Evans?s account are on the whole defective (for different sorts of reason, of course); even though there are features of each of those views which seem to me to be along the right lines. On the other, and in spite of that, I claim that a broadly Fregean theory is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal adequately with some important phenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based demonstrative mode of presentation of an object (a spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.) turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of an important range of mental states with propositional content over time.
Keywords Language  Reference  Evans, G  Frege  Kaplan, D
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Reprint years 1999
DOI 10.5840/gps1998/99563
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References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Understanding Demonstratives.Gareth Evans - 1981 - In Herman Parret (ed.), Meaning and Understanding. Clarendon Press. pp. 280--304.
A Problem About Continued Belief.John Perry - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):317.
Is Knowing a State of Mind?Timothy Williamson - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):533--65.

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Citations of this work BETA

Indexical Thought: The Communication Problem.François Recanati - 2015 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stehpan Torre (eds.), About Oneself. pp. 141-178.
Do Characters Play a Cognitive Role?Vojislav Bozickovic - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):219 – 229.
Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago.
Dinâmica cognitiva.Ludovic Soutif - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.

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