Understanding belief reports

Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595 (1998)
Abstract
In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, this view implies that all utterances of (1) and..
Keywords Belief  Language  Proposition  Russell
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DOI 10.2307/2998375
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Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Millian Descriptivism.Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.
Chalmers on the Objects of Credence.Jesse Fitts - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):343-358.

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