Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation

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Erkenntnis 79 (6):1287-1303 (2014)
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Abstract

Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation

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2013

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10.1007/s10670-013-9529-1

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Author Profiles

Seamus Bradley
London School of Economics (PhD)
Katie Steele
Australian National University

Citations of this work

The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 57-106.
Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1205-1230.

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References found in this work

A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.
Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.

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