Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1333-1344 (2020)
AbstractAccording to attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain, what makes a given sensation count as a pleasure or a pain is just the attitudes of the experiencing agent toward it. In a previous article, I objected to such theories on the grounds that they cannot account for pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them at the time of experience. Recently, Chris Heathwood and Fred Feldman, the two leading contemporary defenders of attitudinal theories, have responded to this objection, in very different ways. In this paper, I reconstruct and evaluate these responses. My conclusion is that neither response succeeds.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Similar books and articles
Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):219-227.
Impure Intellectual Pleasure and the Phaedrus.Kelly E. Arenson - 2016 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):21-45.
The Unity and Commensurability of Pleasures and Pains.Ole Martin Moen - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):527-543.
Taking Pleasure in the Good and Well-Being: The Harmless Pleasures Objection.James Delaney - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):281-294.
Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain.Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.
Unconscious Pleasures and Pains: A Problem for Attitudinal Theories?Fred Feldman - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):472-482.
The Intentionality of Pleasures.Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 307-337.
Restorative Aesthetic Pleasures and the Restoration of Pleasure.Ryan Paul Doran - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (1):73-78.
No, It Isn’T: A Response to Law on Evil Pleasure.Richard Playford - 2018 - [email protected] - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 17 (1):1-12.
Remarks on the Ancient Distinction Between Bodily and Mental Pleasures.Maria Ossowska - 1961 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 4 (1-4):123-127.
References found in this work
Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2004 - Clarendon Press.
The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being.Daniel M. Haybron - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
A New Defense of Hedonism About Well-Being.Ben Bramble - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Citations of this work
An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.
From the Heterogeneity Problem to a Natural‐Kind Approach to Pleasure.Antonin Broi - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure and De Re Desires.Elizabeth Ventham - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (3):361-369.