Virtue consequentialism

Utilitas 17 (3):282-298 (2005)
Abstract
Virtue consequentialism has been held by many prominent philosophers, but has never been properly formulated. I criticize Julia Driver's formulation of virtue consequentialism and offer an alternative. I maintain that according to the best version of virtue consequentialism, attributions of virtue are really disguised comparisons between two character traits, and the consequences of a trait in non-actual circumstances may affect its actual status as a virtue or vice. Such a view best enables the consequentialist to account for moral luck, unexemplified virtues, and virtues and vices involving the prevention of goodness and badness.
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820805001652
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A Royal Road to Consequentialism?Martin Peterson - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):153-169.
Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Glen Pettigrove - 2011 - Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207.

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