Virtue, emotion, and attention

Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):115-131 (2010)
Abstract
The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity.
Keywords virtue  attention  knowledge  value  emotion  perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01620.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,545
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Are Emotions Perceptions of Value?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.
Emotion and Value.Cain Todd - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (10):702-712.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2010-01-12

Total downloads
258 ( #14,216 of 2,210,874 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #26,986 of 2,210,874 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature