Analysis 66 (2):119-127 (2006)

Authors
Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Darren Bradley
University of Leeds
Abstract
If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Hitchcock argues that this credence follows from calculating her fair betting odds, plus the assumption that Sleeping Beauty’s credences should track her fair betting odds. We will show that this last assumption is false. Sleeping Beauty’s credences should not follow her fair betting odds due to a peculiar feature of her epistemic situation.
Keywords Dutch books  Sleeping Beauty  Bayesian
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DOI 10.1093/analys/66.2.119
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Probability.F. Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Philosophical Papers.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - Cambridge University Press.
Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief and Certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.
Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution.Laureano Luna - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):1069-1092.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

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