When is death bad for the one who dies?

Noûs 38 (1):1–28 (2004)
Abstract
Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and Neil Feit.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00460.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,803
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
A Defence of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (3):47-82.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Comparative Harm, Creation and Death.Neil Feit - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.
Plural Harm.Neil Feit - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
Doing Away with Harm1.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
Why Consent May Not Be Needed For Organ Procurement.James Delaney & David Hershenov - 2009 - American Journal of Bioethics 9 (8):3-10.
Is Disability a Neutral Condition?Jeffrey M. Brown - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):188-210.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
491 ( #4,043 of 2,202,706 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #11,426 of 2,202,706 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature