Noûs 38 (1):1–28 (2004)
Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and Neil Feit.
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References found in this work BETA
The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.Jeff McMahan - 2002 - Oup Usa.
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