Noûs 38 (1):1–28 (2004)

Authors
Ben Bradley
Syracuse University
Abstract
Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and Neil Feit.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00460.x
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.
Perfectionism.Thomas Hurka - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Harming as Making Worse Off.Duncan Purves - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2629-2656.
Plural Harm.Neil Feit - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
Doing Away with Harm1.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
Dissolving Death’s Time-of-Harm Problem.Travis Timmerman - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Comparative Harm, Creation and Death.Neil Feit - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.

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