Phronesis 59 (3):246-271 (2014)

Tad Brennan
Cornell University
The Mode of Relativity in Agrippa’s Five Modes does not fit with the other four modes, and disrupts an otherwise elegant system. We argue that it is not the familiar argument from epistemic relativism, but a formal condition on the structure of justifications: the principle that epistemic grounding relations cannot be reflexive. This understanding of Agrippan Relativity leads to a better understanding of the Modes of Hypothesis and Reciprocity, a clearer outline of the structure of Agrippa’s system as a whole, and a new insight into the Two Modes that follow the Five.
Keywords Agrippa  Sextus Empiricus  Agrippan Trilemma  Skepticism  Skeptical Modes  Greek Skepticism
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DOI 10.1163/15685284-12341268
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What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification.Robert J. Fogelin - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):395-400.
The Sceptics.R. J. Hankinson - 1995 - Routledge.

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