Cognitive integration and the ownership of belief: Response to Bernecker

This paper responds to Sven Bernecker’s argument that agent reliabilism cannot accommodate internalist intuitions about clarvoyance cases. In section 1 we clarify a version of agent reliabilism and Bernecker’s objections against it. In section 2 we say more about how the notion of cognitive integration helps to adjudicate clairvoyance cases and other proposed counterexamples to reliabilism. The central idea is that cognitive integration underwrites a kind of belief ownership, which in turn underwrites the sort of responsibility for belief required for subjective justification. In section 3 we say more about what cognitive integration amounts to, drawing on some recent accounts of desire ownership from the literature on autonomy and moral responsibility.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00121.x
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References found in this work BETA
John Greco (2005). Justification is Not Internal. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 257--269.
Laura Waddell Ekstrom (1993). A Coherence Theory of Autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):599-616.

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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel S. Breyer (2013). Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):503-528.

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