Contextualisms in epistemology

Springer (2004)
Authors
Christoph Jäger
University of Innsbruck
Elke Brendel
Universität Bonn
Abstract
Contextualism has become one of the leading paradigms in contemporary epistemology. According to this view, there is no context-independent standard of knowledge, and as a result, all knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive. Contextualists contend that their account of this analysis allows us to resolve some major epistemological problems such as skeptical paradoxes and the lottery paradox, and that it helps us explain various other linguistic data about knowledge ascriptions. The apparent ease with which contextualism seems to solve numerous epistemological quandaries has inspired the burgeoning interest in it. This comprehensive anthology collects twenty original essays and critical commentaries on different aspects of contextualism, written by leading philosophers on the topic. The editors’ introduction sketches the historical development of the contextualist movement and provides a survey and analysis of its arguments and major positions.
Keywords contextualism, invariantism, scepticism
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Alasdair MacIntyre's Analysis of Tradition.Tom Angier - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):540-572.

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