Condorcet's Jury Theorem and the Optimum Number of Voters
Many political theorists and philosophers use Condorcet's Jury Theorem to defend democracy. This paper illustrates an uncomfortable implication of Condorcet's Jury Theorem. Realistically, when the conditions of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem hold, even in very high stakes elections, having more than 100,000 citizens vote does no significant good in securing good political outcomes. On the Condorcet model, unless voters enjoy voting, or unless they produce some other value by voting, then the cost to most voters of voting exceeds the expected epistemic benefits to the common good of their casting a vote. Anyone who is committed to democracy on the basis of the Jury Theorem ought also to hold that widespread voting is wasteful, at least unless she can provide some further justification of mass democratic participation.
|Keywords||Condorcet's Jury Theorem mass democracy epistemic democracy democratic theory democratic participation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Persuasiveness of Democratic Majorities.Robert E. Goodin & David Estlund - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (2):131-142.
Learning Juror Competence: A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem.Jan-Willem Romeijn & David Atkinson - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):237-262.
The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified.Franz Dietrich - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):56-73.
Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
A General Model of a Group Search Procedure, Applied to Epistemic Democracy.Christopher Thompson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1233-1252.
Searching for Compatibility Between the Jury Theorem and Condorcet's Paradox.Thierry Sebagh & Laurence Lepoder - unknown
Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
Some Remarks on the Probability of Cycles - Appendix 3 to 'Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem'.Christian List - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3).
Enfranchising Incompetents: Suretyship and the Joint Authorship of Laws.Robert E. Goodin & Joanne C. Lau - 2011 - Ratio 24 (2):154-166.
On the Significance of the Absolute Margin.Christian List - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):521-544.
Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem.David M. Estlund - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (2):131-162.
Added to index2011-02-22
Total downloads71 ( #74,266 of 2,171,878 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,614 of 2,171,878 )
How can I increase my downloads?