Discussion of Bill Brewer's “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason”

Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):19-32 (2018)
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Abstract

What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of perceptual knowledge: how should we characterise what is going on in seeing that o is F in order to illuminate the contribution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F? My proposal is that seeing o involves conscious acquaintance with o itself, the concrete worldly source of the truth that o is F, in a way that may make it evident to the subject that o is an instance of ‘x is F’ as she understands this, and hence evident that o is F. Seeing that o is F is thus a way of its being evident that o is F and is therefore a way of knowing that o is F.

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Author Profiles

T. Raja Rosenhagen
California State University, Fresno
Miloš Vuletić
University of Belgrade
Adam Pautz
Brown University
3 more

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Patterns of Discovery.Norwood R. Hanson, A. D. Ritchie & Henryk Mehlberg - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):346-349.

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