Ethics and Information Technology 10 (2-3):109-114 (2008)

Authors
Philip Brey
University of Twente
Abstract
In this paper, a critique will be developed and an alternative proposed to Luciano Floridi’s approach to Information Ethics (IE). IE is a macroethical theory that is to both serve as a foundation for computer ethics and to guide our overall moral attitude towards the world. The central claims of IE are that everything that exists can be described as an information object, and that all information objects, qua information objects, have intrinsic value and are therefore deserving of moral respect. In my critique of IE, I will argue that Floridi has presented no convincing arguments that everything that exists has some minimal amount of intrinsic value. I will argue, however, that his theory could be salvaged in large part if it were modified from a value-based into a respect-based theory, according to which many (but not all) inanimate things in the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumental or emotional value for persons
Keywords Object-Oriented Programming   anthropocentrism   artifacts   bioethics   environmental ethics   information ethics   informational realism   intrinsic value   respect
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DOI 10.1007/s10676-008-9170-x
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References found in this work BETA

Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?Luciano Floridi - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):351-370.
Information Ethics: On the Philosophical Foundation of Computer Ethics.Luciano Floridi - 1999 - Ethics and Information Technology 1 (1):33–52.
On the Intrinsic Value of Information Objects and the Infosphere.Luciano Floridi - 2002 - Ethics and Information Technology 4 (4):287–304.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is the Machine Question the Same Question as the Animal Question?Katharyn Hogan - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (1):29-38.
Artificial Intelligence and African Conceptions of Personhood.C. S. Wareham - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):127-136.

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