Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268) (2017)

Authors
Andrew Brenner
Hong Kong Baptist University
Abstract
Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject substance dualism and accept composition, have some explaining to do. Secondly, one popular objection to mereological nihilism, one which contends that mereological nihilism is objectionable insofar as it is incompatible with the existence of people, is untenable.
Keywords composition  mereology  mereological nihilism  personal identity  personal ontology  substance dualism
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqw084
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Why Composition Matters.Andrew M. Bailey & Andrew Brenner - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (8):934-949.
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Immaterialist Solutions to Puzzles in Personal Ontology.Kristin Seemuth Whaley - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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