Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology

Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268) (2017)
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Abstract

Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject substance dualism and accept composition, have some explaining to do. Secondly, one popular objection to mereological nihilism, one which contends that mereological nihilism is objectionable insofar as it is incompatible with the existence of people, is untenable.

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Andrew Brenner
Hong Kong Baptist University

References found in this work

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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