Perceptual experience has conceptual content

In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell (2005)

Authors
Bill Brewer
King's College London
Abstract
I take it for granted that sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs; indeed this claim forms the first premise of my central argument for (CC). 1 The subsequent stages of the argument are intended to establish that a person has such a reason for believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state. Thus, given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content
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Citations of this work BETA

Perception and Content.Bill Brewer - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual Content?José Luis Bermúdez - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):55–72.

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