Reflective luck and belief ownership

Acta Analytica 25 (2):133-154 (2010)
A belief is reflectively lucky if it is a matter of luck that the belief is true, given what a subject is aware of on reflection alone. Various epistemologists have argued that any adequate theory of knowledge should eliminate reflective luck, but doing so has proven difficult. This article distinguishes between two kinds of reflective luck arguments in the literature: local arguments and global arguments. It argues that local arguments are best interpreted as demanding, not that one be reflectively aware of the reliability of the sources of one’s beliefs, but that one’s beliefs be attributable to one as one’s own. The article then argues that global arguments make illegitimate demands, because they require that we be ultimately answerable for our beliefs. In the end, the article argues that epistemologists should shift their focus away from reflective luck and toward the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents.
Keywords Reflective luck  Cognitive agency  Epistemic justification  Internalism  Externalism
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-010-0087-8
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):503-528.
Ownership, Agency, and Defeat.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):253-256.
The Structure of Cognitive Agency.Daniel Breyer - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):285-296.

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