Russell's New Riddle of Induction

Philosophy 54 (207):87 - 97 (1979)
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The most innovative and important parts of Bertrand Russell's Human Knowledge were the result of his first attempt in three decades to come to grips with the problem of induction, or, more generally, ‘non-demonstrative inference’. My purpose here is to argue that that work constituted giant progress on the problem; if I succeed, something will have been done to restore this work to its proper place in the history of philosophy and, correlatively, to rearrange that history



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Bredo Johnsen
University of Houston

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References found in this work

Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1949 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 54 (2):198-199.
The Roots of Reference.W. V. Quine - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):93-96.
A query on confirmation.Nelson Goodman - 1946 - Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):383-385.

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