Authors
William F. Brewer
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the forms of response that scientists make when confronted with anomalous data. We postulate that there are seven ways in which an individual who currently holds a theory can respond to anomalous data: (1) ignore the data; (2) reject the data; (3) exclude the data from the domain of the current theory; (4) hold the data in abeyance; (5) reinterpret the data; (6) make peripheral changes to the current theory; or (7) change the theory. We analyze psychological experiments and cases from the history of science to support this proposal. Implications for the philosophy of science are discussed.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,229
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Making Sense of Non-Refuting Anomalies.María Caamaño-Alegre - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):261-282.
The Role of Replication in Psychological Science.Samuel C. Fletcher - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-19.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Data Models and the Acquisition and Manipulation of Data.Todd Harris - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1508-1517.
Mental Models in Data Interpretation.Clark A. Chinn & William F. Brewer - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):219.
Openness in the Social Sciences: Sharing Data.Joan E. Sieber - 1991 - Ethics and Behavior 1 (2):69 – 86.
Empirical Data Sets Are Algorithmically Compressible: Reply to McAllister.Charles Twardy, Steve Gardner & David Dowe - 2005 - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 36 (2):391-402.
A Lot of Data.Kent Johnson - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):788-799.
Theory-Ladenness of Evidence: A Case Study From History of Chemistry.K. P. - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (2):351-368.
Psychological Explanation: The 'Private Data' Hypothesis.Michel Treisman - 1962 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (August):130-143.
Some Thoughts on Data and Theory in Linguistics.Richard E. Grandy - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:605 - 609.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total views
53 ( #203,044 of 2,455,436 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #143,406 of 2,455,436 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes