Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):3-17 (2009)
Goldman's project of a veritistic social epistemology is based on a descriptive-success account of truth and a weak notion of knowledge as mere true belief. It is argued that, contrary to Goldman's opinion, pragmatism and social constructivism are not necessarily ruled out by the descriptive-success account of truth. Furthermore, it is shown that it appears to be questionable whether Goldman has succeeded to show that there is a weak notion of knowledge. But even if such a weak notion of knowledge can be defended, this notion can result in a complete separation of knowledge from epistemic value, which does not seem to be in accordance with Goldman's concept of societal knowledge.
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