The Object View of Perception

Topoi 36 (2):215-227 (2017)

Abstract

We perceive a world of mind-independent macroscopic material objects such as stones, tables, trees, and animals. Our experience is the joint upshot of the way these things are and our route through them, along with the various relevant circumstances of perception; and it depends on the normal operation of our perceptual systems. How should we characterise our perceptual experience so as to respect its basis and explain its role in grounding empirical thought and knowledge? I offered an answer to this question in Perception and its objects. Here I aim to clarify some of my central arguments and to develop and defend the position further in the light of subsequent critical discussion.

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Bill Brewer
King's College London

Citations of this work

VIIā€”Naive Realism and Diaphaneity.Craig French - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):149-175.
Perception and Ordinary Objects.Alex Byrne - 2019 - In Javier Cumpa & Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.
Perception and Evidence.Alex Byrne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170:101-113.

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